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Interpreting Intent
HOW RESEARCH ON FOLK JUDGMENTS OF
INTENTIONALITY CAN INFORM STATUTORY
ANALYSIS
Julia Kobick & Joshua Knobe†
On May 4, 2009, the Supreme Court released its opinion
in Shell Oil Co. v. United States.1 The case was not only an
important one in environmental law, but it also raised a
number of complex conceptual issues. In particular, the Court
found that it had to make a difficult decision about the
relationship between liability and intentionality.
The facts of the case were as follows: Shell Oil Co.
contracted to sell a hazardous pesticide to an independent
chemical distribution company.2 Shell knew that some of the
pesticide would inevitably end up leaking or spilling as it was
being transferred into the distribution company’s holding
tanks, but Shell was not actively trying to make the pesticide
leak.3 Its goal was just to sell and transport the pesticide. In
other words, Shell had the knowledge that its actions would be
leading to pesticide leaks, but its purpose was not to create
these leaks, but rather to sell a useful product. Predictably, the
dangerous pesticide regularly leaked during transfer, leading
to extensive soil and groundwater contamination.4 The
Environmental Protection Agency spent $8 million cleaning up
the environmental damage and sued the parties connected to
the environmental harm, including Shell, for remediation
costs.5
†

Julia Kobick, J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. Joshua Knobe,
Assistant Professor, Program in Cognitive Science and Department of Philosophy, Yale
University. Thanks to Richard Lazarus, Fiery Cushman, Adam Kolber and Neal
Feigenson for their insightful comments.
1
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States (Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct.
1870 (2009).
2
Id. at 1874-75.
3
See id. at 1875.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 1876.
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Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),6 Shell could be
considered liable for cleanup costs if it had “arranged for
disposal . . . of hazardous substances,”7 a condition which some
courts had interpreted as requiring a degree of intentionality in
causing the hazardous substances to be disposed.8 The Court
was therefore faced with a complex question. Given that Shell
had the knowledge that it would be disposing of the pesticide
but did not act with the purpose of disposing of it, could it
rightly be said to have disposed of the substance with sufficient
intentionality to render it liable under CERCLA?
The Court’s decision in Shell can serve as a kind of case
study of a broader question: how to determine whether an act
counts as intentional or unintentional. This question has
played a crucial role in numerous branches of legal scholarship,
figuring in key debates concerning everything from civil rights
law9 to criminal law.10 It has been approached from numerous
different theoretical perspectives.11
Our aim here is to introduce a new consideration into
the existing literature on this question. A growing body of
empirical work in experimental philosophy has examined the
patterns in people’s ordinary judgments about whether specific
acts were performed intentionally or unintentionally. This
work suggests that such judgments are based on a
6

42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-9675 (2006).
Id. § 9607(a)(3).
8
Compare United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918,
948 (9th Cir. 2008) (CERCLA permits arranger liability when the hazardous waste is a
“foreseeable byproduct of, but not the purpose of, the transaction . . . .”) with United
States v. Cello-Foil Prods., 100 F.3d 1227, 1232 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[O]nce it has been
demonstrated that a party possessed the requisite intent to be an arranger, the party
cannot escape liability by claiming that it had no intent to have the waste disposed in a
particular manner or at a particular site.”) and Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2
F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993) (the term “arranged for” implies “intentional action”).
9
For instance, a plaintiff bringing an equal protection challenge to a facially
neutral governmental action that has a disparate impact on a protected class has the
burden of proving that the government acted intentionally to discriminate. Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
10
For instance, the Model Penal Code distinguishes between mens reas
sufficient for culpability by describing different levels of intentionality. The distinction
between a “purposeful” and “knowledgeable” mens rea in the Model Penal Code was
meant to clarify logically inconsistent application of a mens rea of “intent” used in
many states’ criminal statutes. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1955).
11
See, e.g., R.A. Duff, The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie, 1990
CRIM. L. REV. 637-42; Nicola Lacey, A Clear Conception of Intention: Elusive or
Illusory? 56 MOD. L. REV. 621 (1993); Alan Norrie, Oblique Intention and Legal Politics,
1989 CRIM. L. REV. 793-807.
7
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sophisticated, and perhaps universal, system of criteria.
Strikingly, these criteria are not limited to judgments about an
actor’s mental state, but instead encompass judgments based
on the moral status of an action’s consequences.
In Part I, we discuss Shell and another recent Supreme
Court case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon,12 which also turned on questions of
intentionality. We explore the parties’ arguments as to
whether the action triggering liability in each case requires a
purposeful mental state or can be satisfied with knowledge.
Part II explores the body of experimental research that looks
empirically at the ways in which people actually use the
concept of intentional action in ordinary language. In Part III,
we bring together the legal and empirical issues discussed in
earlier sections, examining the ways in which empirical data
about the way people actually use certain concepts might bear
on the Supreme Court’s reasoning regarding the requisite
degree of intentionality in the Shell and Babbitt case studies.
I.

TWO CASE STUDIES

At first blush, Shell appears to be a straightforward
case of statutory interpretation. The Court was asked to choose
between competing interpretations of “arranged for disposal,” a
phrase laden with ambiguity as to whether a purpose to
dispose of hazardous substances is necessary or whether
knowledge that disposal will occur can be sufficient.13 That
semantic determination, however, is grounded in a judgment
about intentionality, and, more specifically, requires the Court
to decide the degree of intentionality suggested in vague
statutory wording.
Courts are often asked to draw bright lines between
levels of intentionality when language makes those bright lines
difficult to discern. Judges turn to dictionaries and legislative
histories to help them parse the clearest reading of unclear

12

515 U.S. 687 (1995).
The Court acknowledged that “CERCLA does not define what it means to
‘arrange for’ disposal of a hazardous substance.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
United States (Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009) (citing Cello-Foil Prods., 100
F.3d at 1231; Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751; Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,
893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990)).
13
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phrases,14 but their ultimate conclusions about sufficient
intentionality are likely also infused with some intuitive sense
of intentionality. In situations where linguistic ambiguity
increases the likelihood that intuitions will play a role in
drawing a line in the murky terrain between acting for a
purpose versus acting with knowledge, it is helpful to
understand what empirical research tells us about human
intuitions about intentionality. It is, above all, this intuitive
human sense that we wish to explore in this paper.
In this section, we introduce the competing arguments
in two cases where the Court was forced to make a
determination about sufficient intentionality for liability based
on determinations of statutory language. Shell is the more
recent of the two, but the other also involved strong arguments
about whether liability was triggered by acting for the specific
purpose of causing environmental harm versus knowing that
environmental harm would occur. In that case, Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,15 the Court
determined the level of intentionality required under the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)16 for an actor to be held
criminally and civilly liable for “taking” an endangered species.
Curiously, although both cases presented statutory ambiguity,
the Court took different stances in the two cases. These
divergent results in Shell and Babbitt are thus useful lenses for
exploring how folk judgments about intentionality can inform
legal reasoning, particularly when an agent knows that its
actions will lead to a particular outcome, but does not act for
the specific purpose of bringing about that outcome.
A.

The Litigants’ Positions in Shell

Because of the ambiguity inherent in the phrase
“arranged for disposal,” the parties in Shell differed sharply
over whether CERCLA required that an agent specifically act
for the purpose of disposing of hazardous waste in order to be
held liable for the costs of remediation. Central to Shell’s
argument was its interpretation of CERCLA as requiring a
purpose to dispose of hazardous waste rather than knowledge
14

See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128-34 (1998)
(employing a textual analysis and an inquiry into legislative history to parse the
meaning of the statutory term “carry”).
15
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
16
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
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that leaks would foreseeably occur.17 The government, on the
other hand, argued that Shell did act as an arranger under
CERCLA because its knowledge that leaks would directly occur
was a sufficient level of intentionality to trigger arranger
liability.18 Traditionally, courts have read ambiguous phrases in
CERCLA to permit liberal imposition of liability in order to
achieve the act’s remedial goals.19
Shell grounded its claim that CERCLA commands a
purpose to dispose in what it saw as the most logical reading of
“arranged for.” It argued that the plain meaning of “arranged
for” implies intent because the preposition “for” indicates a
purpose.20 Reading the words “arranged for” together with
“disposal,” Shell also argued that it intended to arrange for the
sale of a useful product, not to arrange for disposal.21 That is,
Shell did not believe it could be held liable since its primary
objective was to enter into a contract to sell and transport the
pesticide, not to contract with the distributor to dispose of the
pesticide.22 Despite any statutory definitions of “disposal” that
may suggest that disposal can occur unintentionally, Shell
argued that it is logically incoherent to claim that a party could

17

Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, Shell Oil Co. v. United States, No.
07-1607 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2008); Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Shell Oil Co.
v. United States, No. 07-1607 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 2009).
18
Brief of Respondent at 17-19, Shell Oil Co. v. United States, No. 07-1607
(9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2008).
19
See, e.g., United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918,
948 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We have avoided giving the term ‘arranger’ too narrow an
interpretation to avoid frustrating CERCLA’s goal of requiring that companies
responsible for the introduction of hazardous waste into the environment pay for
remediation.”); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th
Cir. 1989) (“While the legislative history of CERCLA sheds little light on the intended
meaning of [‘arranged for disposal’], courts have concluded that a liberal judicial
interpretation is consistent with CERCLA’s ‘overwhelming remedial’ statutory
scheme.”); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986) (“CERCLA is essentially a remedial statute designed by Congress to
protect and preserve public health and the environment. We are therefore obligated to
construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative
purposes.”) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We will not interpret section 9607(a) in any way that
apparently frustrates the statute’s goals, in the absence of a specific congressional
intention otherwise.”).
20
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 17, at 18; Reply Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 17, at 3.
21
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 17, at 20.
22
Id. (“The intent requirement embodied in the phrase ‘arranged for’ is not
satisfied where, as here, there is no evidence that Shell intended to do anything more
than arrange for the sale (not disposal) of a useful product (not hazardous waste) and
transfer ownership, possession and control before unloading.”).
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arrange for an accident.23 Shell saw the regular pattern of
leakage and spillage of the pesticide as accidental occurrences,
not incidents that were desired or sought after.24 From Shell’s
perspective, “arrang[ing] for disposal” requires a specific
purpose to dispose, and knowledge of leakage or spillage is not
sufficient for imposition of CERCLA arranger liability.25
The government’s contention that arranger liability
applied to Shell depended on an interpretation of “arranged for
disposal” that permits liability when a party has knowledge
that disposal will occur. In contrast to Shell, the government
argued that the plain reading of CERCLA suggests no intent to
dispose requirement, because CERCLA’s definition of disposal
encompasses accidental processes such as “spilling” and
“leaking.”26 That is, the government’s theory posited that when
a party enters a transaction that it knows will directly result in
either intentional or unintentional disposal of hazardous
substances, that party has arranged for disposal.27 This theory
recognized that “the delivery of a useful product [may be] the
ultimate purpose” of a transaction, but that knowledge that
spills would certainly occur as a side effect “was sufficient to
establish Shell’s intent to dispose of hazardous substances.”28
The government argued that this interpretation of “arranged
for disposal” reflects CERCLA’s remedial statutory scheme.29
Affirming the district court’s holding that Shell was an
arranger under section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated on the circumstances
under which a party is subject to arranger liability.30 The court
recognized two types of arranger liability: “direct” arranger

23

See id. at 21 (“Although the statute defines disposal to include spilling, the
critical words for present purposes are ‘arranged for.’ The words imply intentional
action. The only thing that [the defendant] arranged for [a common carrier] to do was
to deliver [a chemical] to [a customer’s] storage tanks. It did not arrange for spilling
the stuff on the ground. No one arranges for an accident.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Judge Posner in Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir.
1993))).
24
See id.
25
Id. at 18-20.
26
Brief of Respondent, supra note 18, at 17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29)
(2006) (adopting the definition of “disposal” in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)).
27
Id. at 17-18.
28
Id. at 24.
29
Id. at 19.
30
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 917, 948 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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liability, and “broader” arranger liability.31 Direct liability
results when the central purpose of a transaction is to dispose
of hazardous waste.32 Broader liability results when there may
be a separate specific purpose of the transaction, but the
“transactions . . . contemplate disposal as a part of, but not the
focus of, the transaction.”33 The court noted that the broader
form of arranger liability “can involve situations, like the
present one, in which the alleged arrangers did not contract
directly for the disposal of hazardous substances but did
contract for the sale or transfer of hazardous substances, which
were then disposed of.”34 In this “broader” context, the disposal
of the hazardous waste is a “foreseeable byproduct of, but not
the purpose of,” the transaction between Shell and the
distributor that led to hazardous waste contamination.35 That
is, even though Shell did not specifically act for the purpose of
disposing of the pesticide, it was liable because it knew with
certainty that leakage and spillage of the pesticide would result
from its arrangement with the distributor.36
B.

The Litigants’ Positions in Babbitt

The arguments that arose in Babbitt, decided fourteen
years before Shell, raised a similar debate about the degree of
intentionality required for liability under a federal statute. The
plaintiffs in Babbitt, a group representing small landowners
31

Id. (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (9th Cir.

32

Id. at 948.
Id.
Id. at 948-49.
Id. at 948.
The court cited six factors that demonstrate the foreseeability of the

2002)).
33
34
35
36

disposal:
(1) Spills occurred every time the deliveries were made; (2) Shell arranged for
delivery and chose the common carrier that transported its product to the . . .
site; (3) Shell changed its delivery process so as to require the use of large
storage tanks, thus necessitating the transfer of large quantities of chemicals
and causing leakage from corrosion of the large steel tanks; (4) Shell provided
a rebate for improvements in [the distributor’s] bulk handling and safety
facilities and required an inspection by a qualified engineer; (5) Shell
regularly would reduce the purchase price of the [pesticide], in an amount the
district court concluded was linked to loss from leakage; and (6) Shell
distributed a manual and created a checklist of the manual requirements, to
ensure that [the pesticide] tanks were being operated in accordance with
Shell’s safety instructions.
Id. at 950-51.
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and logging companies, brought a facial challenge to a
regulation that clarified prohibitions on “harm[ing]”
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(“ESA”).37 Under section 9 of the ESA, it is unlawful to “take”
an endangered or threatened species,38 and section 3 of the
statute defines the term “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect . . . .”39 Adding
meaning to the “harm” prohibition from the “take” definition,
the Department of Interior regulation clarified that unlawful
“harm” to an endangered species is “an act which actually kills
or injures wildlife,” then made clear that “[s]uch act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering.”40
This regulation deprived the plaintiffs of deriving
maximum economic value from their land through logging and
other forest products operations, because their land was home
to the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker and the
threatened northern spotted owl.41 Had the plaintiffs knowingly
engaged in logging or other habitat modification activities that
actually resulted in death or injury to members of these
species, they would have been liable for criminal and civil
penalties under the ESA.42 The plaintiffs had not yet modified
the habitats of the listed species, and thus had not yet incurred
civil or criminal penalties at the time of their lawsuit; instead,
they chose to challenge the Secretary’s regulation on its face as
an impermissible interpretation of the ESA. In other words,
they could foresee that if they engaged in habitat modification,
with the purpose of earning money, then their logging and
other activities would have the side effect of actually killing or
37

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
39
Id. § 1532(19).
40
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006).
41
The Endangered Species Act defines an endangered species as “any species
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” and
a threatened species as one “likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(6), (20).
42
Section 11 of the ESA permits up to one year of prison and a $50,000 fine
for “knowingly” taking an individual member of an endangered species. Id. § 1540(b).
Courts have held that section 11 imposes a general, not specific, intent standard. See
United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fish and Wildlife Service
has promulgated a regulation asserting that section 11 applies to threatened species as
well as endangered species. 50 C.F.R. 17.31(a).
38
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injuring members of endangered or threatened species. This
consequence would result in liability for the plaintiff property
owners based on the indirect harms caused by habitat
modification.
The crux of Sweet Home’s argument was that the
prohibition on takings in the ESA does not cover habitat
modification, but rather only disallows direct, purposeful
efforts to harm an endangered or threatened species.43 Sweet
Home contended that the plain meaning of the word “harm,” in
its context as a statutory descriptor of “take,” connotes
“purposeful efforts to injure or capture wildlife; the direct
application of force to, or physical intrusions on, specific
creatures; direct and concrete injury to identifiable animals;
and actions which a specifically acting human does to a specific
creature.”44 In promoting a narrow definition of “harm,” Sweet
Home argued that the Court should read the ambiguity
inherent in the statutory language to require that actors
intentionally harm discrete animals.45 According to Sweet
Home’s view, vagueness in the ESA should not extend liability
to “ordinary actions” of habitat modification that
“unintentionally deprive listed wildlife of some environmental
benefit” like breeding grounds or access to food.46 In repeatedly
insisting that, in the ESA context, “harm” can only mean a
“purposeful effort to injure” discrete animals, Sweet Home
made the case that the takings prohibition could not include
foreseeably harmful effects on individuals within the species.47
That is, to violate the ESA under Sweet Home’s theory, an
actor must have acted for the purpose of harming the
individual in the species, not merely have known that habitat
modification actions would eventually harm individuals in the
species by impacting essential species behaviors.
Disagreeing with Sweet Home’s insistence that “take”
clearly mandates direct and intentional harm as prerequisites
to liability, the government found no suggestion in ESA
language that called for any cabining of the word “harm” with

43

Brief for Respondents at *6, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for
a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1995 WL 130541.
44
Id. at *8, *13 (emphasis added).
45
Id. at *13 n.15 (arguing that harm, like the word “kill,” requires
“intentional and directed conduct”).
46
Id. at *8-*9, *13.
47
Id. at *10.
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an intent requirement.48 Pointing to section 11 of the ESA,
which explicitly imposes a knowing mens rea on violations of
the ESA, the government argued that an actor violates the
ESA whenever it “knows, for example, that his action harasses,
harms, or wounds the types of species affected.”49 In the
government’s view, neither knowledge that the species is listed
nor a specific intent to violate the ESA is required under the
statute; rather, knowledge that one’s behavior will harm a
species by significantly disrupting its essential behaviors is
sufficient.50
The government used the breadth of several other words
in the ESA definition of “take,” including “harass,” “wound,”
and “pursue,” to further its claim that “harm” permits
imposition of liability on parties that knowingly modify
habitats of listed species while foreseeing harm to those
species.51 This breadth, according to the government, underlies
Congress’ intent to halt extinction and promote species
preservation in the ESA. Analogizing the prohibition on
“harming” to “wounding” a listed animal, the government
noted, “[W]ounding a protected species violates the ESA even if
it is the unintended consequence of otherwise lawful activity
directed at a different object.”52 That is, if an actor specifically
intends and desires to engage in a lawful activity, he will be
liable under the ESA if he knows that his habitat modification
activities will significantly disrupt species behaviors in a way
that causes injury or death to members of the species.
Reversing itself on an earlier ruling, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the Department of Interior
regulation was an impermissible construction of “harm” within
the meaning of the ESA.53 The court determined that the
regulation’s inclusion of habitat modification in the definition
48

Reply Brief for the Petitioners at *1, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1995 WL 170170.
49
Id. at *2.
50
Id.
51
Id. at *2 n.2.
52
Id. at *4.
53
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d
1463, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals initially determined that the word
“harm” was broad enough to permit a wide range of interpretations, and found the
agency’s interpretation reasonable. Id. After taking the rare step of granting a petition
for rehearing, the court reversed its earlier holding, concluding that the statutory
words surrounding “harm” counseled against interpreting the word broadly. Id. at
1464-65. The three-judge panel split into an opinion of the court, a concurrence, and a
dissent. Id. at 1464.
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of “harm” was too broad of an interpretation of the term.54
Reading “harm” in the context of the surrounding verbs also
defining “take,” the court understood “harm” to mean “a
substantially direct application of force” against the listed
species.55 Although directness of force and a purpose or desire to
harm are conceptually linked, the D.C. Circuit’s majority
opinion did not directly address intentionality. Judge Sentelle’s
concurring opinion, however, reincorporated his earlier
contention that the ESA does require that an actor act
intentionally:
In the present statute, all the other terms among which “harm” finds
itself keeping company relate to an act which a specifically acting
human does to a specific individual representative of a wildlife
species. In fact, they are the sorts of things an individual human
commonly does when he intends to “take” an animal. Otherwise put,
if I were intent on taking a rabbit, a squirrel, or a deer, as the term
“take” is used in common English parlance, I would go forth with my
dogs or my guns . . . .56

Reading Judge Williams’ majority opinion and Judge Sentelle’s
concurring opinion together, the D.C. Circuit held that
foreseeably harmful effects on listed species resulting from
habitat modification are not enough to trigger liability. Instead,
an actor is liable under the “harm” prong of the takings
prohibition when he directly and intentionally causes death or
injury to an endangered or threatened animal.
II.

THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In short, although the Supreme Court faced very
different cases in Shell and Babbitt, these two cases ended up
involving the same basic issue: how to determine the precise
conditions under which an act counts as “intentional.” In both
cases, the Court was faced with an agent that knew that it
would bring about a particular outcome as a side effect to its
primary objective, but that did not act for the purpose of
bringing about that outcome. The question was whether such
an agent could be deemed to have acted intentionally. In Part
III, we examine how the Supreme Court answered this
question in Shell and Babbitt. This Part, however, will look at
54

Id. at 1465.
Id.
56
Id. at 1472 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
55
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studies that give indication as to how ordinary people might
have answered it.
At least initially, it might be thought that this question
is a highly technical one, the sort of thing about which ordinary
people would not have a definite opinion either way. As it
happens, though, recent work in experimental philosophy
suggests that these appearances are deceiving. In fact,
experimental research indicates that people have a quite
complex and sophisticated understanding of the criteria for
intentional action. Indeed, it may be that these criteria are a
universal feature of our human cognitive capacities. Though
most people cannot articulate at an abstract level the
properties a behavior would have to have to be intentional,
they show remarkably consistent patterns in their intuitions
about concrete cases.
To examine people’s ordinary criteria for intentional
action, experimental philosophers therefore proceed by
presenting people with hypotheticals and asking whether the
agents in these hypotheticals acted “intentionally” or
“unintentionally.” By systematically varying the fact pattern of
the hypotheticals themselves, one can then determine which
factors influence people’s ordinary intentional action
intuitions. Thus, if one wants to arrive at a better
understanding of the roles of purpose and knowledge in
people’s ordinary conception of intentional action, one can
present experimental subjects with hypotheticals in which an
agent does not specifically act for the purpose of bringing about
a particular outcome but does know that the outcome will arise
as a result of his or her actions. One can then look empirically
at the precise conditions under which subjects do and do not
say that such outcomes were brought about intentionally.
Appropriately enough, one of the key experimental
studies in this research program involves an agent who either
helps or harms the environment.57 Subjects in the “help
condition” of the experiment received the following
hypothetical about an agent who does not specifically have a
desire to help the environment but who does know that his
actions will bring about environmental help:

57

Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language,
63 ANALYSIS 190 (2003).
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The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us
increase profits, and it will also help the environment.”
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about
helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I
can. Let’s start the new program.”
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was
helped.58

These subjects were then asked whether or not the chairman of
the board helped the environment intentionally.59
Subjects in the “harm condition” received a hypothetical
that was exactly the same, except that the word “help” was
replaced with “harm”:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us
increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.”
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about
harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I
can. Let’s start the new program.”
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was
harmed.60

These subjects were then asked whether the chairman harmed
the environment intentionally.61
The results revealed a striking asymmetry. Most
subjects in the harm condition (82%) judged that the chairman
harmed the environment intentionally, while relatively few
subjects in the help condition (23%) reported that the chairman
helped the environment intentionally.62 Yet it seems that the
only major difference between these cases lies in the moral
status of the behavior the agent preformed. Hence, it appears
that people’s moral judgments have an impact on their views
as to whether a behavior is performed intentionally or
unintentionally.
More specifically, the results indicate that people’s
moral judgments affect the role of knowledge and purpose in
their intuitions about intentional action. There does not seem
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to be any single answer, applicable in all cases, as to whether
people think that an agent acts intentionally if he or she has
knowledge of an outcome but lacks a specific purpose to bring
about that outcome. Instead, people’s intuitions in such cases
seem to depend on the moral status of the behavior itself. If the
behavior is morally good, people regard it as unintentional,
whereas if it is morally bad, people regard it as intentional.
Though this result may seem surprising, it has been replicated
in numerous further experiments.63 Regardless of whether
people are thinking about the environment,64 about military
strategy,65 or just about a person whose behavior will impact
the neighborhood kids,66 they show the same overall pattern of
intuitions. In cases where the agent has knowledge but lacks a
specific purpose, they are inclined to regard the action as
intentional when it is morally bad but not when it is morally
good.
Subsequent research revealed that this basic effect
continues to emerge across a wide variety of subject
populations and experimental procedures. It emerges when the
hypotheticals are translated into Hindi and given to native
Hindi speakers.67 It emerges when the hypotheticals are
presented as puppet shows and given to children who are only
four years old.68 It even emerges when the experiment is
conducted on subjects who have lesions in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and therefore show massive deficits
in the capacity for normal emotional response.69 The effect
appears to be a highly robust aspect of our ordinary
understanding of human action.
In research on this issue within experimental
philosophy, a central aim is to understand the fundamental
63

Adam Feltz, The Knobe Effect: A Brief Overview, 28 J. MIND & BEHAV. 265
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Knobe, supra note 57, at 191.
Mark Phelan & Hagop Sarkissian, Is the ‘Trade-off Hypothesis’ Worth
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Concepts, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 171, 185 (Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols
eds., 2008).
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Joshua Knobe & Arudra Burra, The Folk Concepts of Intention and
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cognitive processes that lie at the root of this effect. The effort
to describe these processes has led to an increasingly complex
and wide-ranging debate, with a bewildering variety of
theoretical proposals and a conflicting array of different
experimental studies.70 Here, however, we will be putting all of
these controversial issues to one side. Our aim is not to
speculate about the underlying cognitive processes but simply
to describe the patterns observed in people’s ordinary
intuitions. For the present exploration, we will be especially
concerned with one key result. In cases where an agent
performs a behavior with a morally bad outcome, if the agent
does not act for the purpose of bringing about that outcome but
does know that the outcome will result, studies show that
people have a consistent tendency to regard the behavior as
intentional.71
III.

A ROLE FOR THE EMPIRICAL DATA IN STATUTORY
ANALYSIS

With this empirical framework in hand, we can now
return to the cases of Shell and Babbitt. We noted above that
the litigants in both of these cases offered specific proposals
about how to apply the notion of acting intentionally. In this
section, we examine the actual decisions the Court made in
evaluating these proposals.
A.

The Court’s Decisions in Shell and Babbitt

The Court announced its decision in Shell in May 2009,
ruling 8-1 in favor of Shell.72 In his majority opinion, Justice
Stevens began by clarifying the outer bounds of CERCLA
liability, noting that liability under CERCLA would clearly
70

See generally Cushman & Mele, supra note 66 (explaining the effect in
terms of three different rules that subjects apply in different cases); Edouard Machery,
The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues, 23
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benefit and a cost); Shaun Nichols & Joseph Ulatowski, Intuitions and Individual
Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited, 22 MIND & LANGUAGE 346 (2007) (explaining
the effect in terms of two distinct interpretations of the expression “intentionally”);
Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe, The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment, MIND &
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of Folk Psychology, 130 PHIL. STUD. 203, 209 (2006).
72
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attach to any entity that entered into a transaction “for the sole
purpose of discarding a . . . hazardous substance.”73 At the other
extreme, a party could not be liable under CERCLA if it
entered into a transaction with the purpose of selling a useful
product, yet was unaware that the buyer disposed of the useful
hazardous substance in a manner that caused environmental
contamination. Such easy cases are rare, and Justice Stevens
acknowledged that in the vast middle area of cases where the
seller has some knowledge of the buyer’s disposal, courts must
engage in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine if liability is
proper.74
Attempting to give meaning to CERCLA’s undefined
term “arranged for,” the Court then proceeded to parse what it
viewed as the ordinary meaning of the term.75 Under the
Court’s reading of “arranged for,” an entity may qualify as an
arranger under CERCLA “when it takes intentional steps to
dispose of a hazardous substance.”76 That is, the Court
determined that the statute called for intentional action.
Addressing the government’s contention that foresight of spills
is sufficient to establish intent to dispose under CERCLA, the
Court concluded that in this case, the “evidence does not
support an inference that Shell intended such spills to occur.”77
Justice Stevens characterized the spills as minor and
accidental, and viewed Shell’s attempts to reduce spills as
evidence of a lack of intent for spills to occur rather than as
evidence of the foreseeability of hazardous waste spillage.78
The Court’s reasoning in Babbitt led it to arrive at the
opposite conclusion. Justice Stevens’s 6-3 majority opinion held
that knowledge that harm to endangered species would be a
side effect of otherwise lawful activity was sufficient to trigger
liability.79 At the outset, the Court assumed that logging and
habitat modification activities “will have the effect, even
though unintended, of detrimentally changing the natural
habitat . . . and that, as a consequence, members of those
species will be killed or injured.”80 That is, just as in Shell, the
73
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environmental harm in Babbitt was foreseeable and certain to
occur as a side effect of the plaintiffs’ actions. Unlike Shell,
however, the Court deemed reasonable the government’s
interpretation of “harm” as permitting liability when an actor
knows that his actions will “result[] in actual injury or death to
members of an endangered or threatened species.”81 In a
footnote, the Court also acknowledged that the ESA specifically
imposes a criminal mens rea of “knowing,” which incorporates
“ordinary requirements of proximate causation and
foreseeability.”82
Notably, the Court’s majority opinion devoted few lines
to actively discussing the level of intent suggested semantically
by the word “harm,” choosing instead to emphasize the effects
on endangered and threatened species that would result from
the habitat modification activities.83 Interpreting a subsequent
amendment to the ESA as probative of Congress’
understanding of the meaning of “harm” within section 3, the
Court reasoned that “Congress had in mind foreseeable, rather
than merely accidental, effects on listed species.”84 Such
language frames the Court’s analysis of the case in terms of
the outcome of habitation modification, as opposed to whether
or not the plain meaning of the word “harm” requires a
purpose to harm or knowledge that harm will certainly occur.
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor agreed with this
consequences-oriented basis for deciding the case. Noting that
the regulation is limited to foreseeable effects on listed species,
she concurred because the regulation was also “limited by its
terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual
animals.”85
Justice Scalia’s dissent vigorously argued that the ESA
called for intentional action as a prerequisite to liability.
Choosing to interpret “take” as the operative word in the ESA,
Justice Scalia recounted various statutory and common law
precedents to conclude that “take” implies actions “done
directly and intentionally.”86 Turning next to the word “harm,”
81

Id. at 697. The Court also noted that Chevron deference to the agency’s
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his dissent interpreted “harm” in light of its nine surrounding
words, and concluded that these words all call for “conduct
intentionally directed against a particular animal or animals.”87
This conclusion that “take” and “harm” suggest that
intentionality is a necessary condition for liability under the
ESA contrasts with the majority’s reasoning, which rested
much of its holding on the outcome-oriented language of the
government’s regulation.
B.

Applying the Experimental Results to the Court’s
Decisions

Although both of these cases involved statutory
ambiguity as to the level of intentionality required for liability,
the Court appears to have taken a different approach in each
case to arrive at its conclusion about sufficient intentionality.
The decision in Shell was that liability is triggered when an
entity specifically acts for the purpose of disposing of
hazardous substances, whereas the decision in Babbitt was
that foreseeability of death or injury to listed species is
sufficient to trigger liability. A question now arises as to how to
think about these different approaches and which would be
appropriate to which sorts of cases.
In thinking about such questions, the Court must
balance a wide array of competing considerations. It considers
relevant precedent, apparent congressional intent, the Chevron
doctrine’s two-step analysis,88 and a host of other factors. In
this article, however, we will not attempt to discuss the full
range of such issues. Instead, we focus on just one type of
consideration that figured in the two cases discussed above. In
Babbitt and Shell, the litigants and the Court appealed to
notions about how intentionality is suggested by statutory
language. Our aim is to introduce another consideration that
may aid judicial attempts to parse appropriate intentionality
from unclear language.
Drawing on the experimental evidence described above,
we argue that people’s ordinary criteria for intentional action
differ in certain respects from the criteria the Court invoked in
87
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its decisions. Indeed, the evidence suggests that people’s
ordinary way of understanding these issues is quite different
from the one employed by the Court. It is not just that people’s
ordinary criteria depart from the Court’s criteria in one or
another minor detail; rather, people seem to be departing from
the Court’s criteria in the basic structure of their decisionmaking process itself.
In the two cases under discussion here, the Court
treated questions about whether an entity acts intentionally as
quite separate from questions about whether the entity had
actually done anything morally harmful or wrong. The Court’s
reasoning suggested that questions about whether an entity
acted intentionally were ultimately to be decided by the mental
states of the entity itself, such as whether it had a specific
purpose or mere knowledge. After the issue of intentionality is
decided, there may then be additional questions about harm
and fault, and these questions may play a role in judgments as
to whether the entity is liable for any damages, but such issues
were thought not to be relevant to the more basic question as to
whether the act itself was intentional or unintentional.
So, for example, after Shell, an entity can only qualify
as an “arranger” under CERCLA to the extent that it
intentionally arranges for the disposal of hazardous
substances, and that entity can only be said to have acted
“intentionally” to the extent that it acted for the relevant
purpose.89 However, the moral status of the environmental
harm caused is entirely irrelevant to a determination about
whether an entity can be considered an arranger.
As we noted in Part II, people’s ordinary judgments do
not seem to work this way. People do not seem to create a strict
separation between questions of intentionality and questions of
morality, such that the latter can never be relevant to the
former. They do not seem to set up a single, invariant standard
for intentional action that is applied to all cases, whether they
be morally good or morally bad. Instead, people seem to treat
moral judgments as relevant in some fundamental way to
judgments of intentionality. In cases where the agent had
knowledge but not purpose, their intentionality judgments
seem to vary depending on whether they regard the behavior
as morally good or morally bad.
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Hence, if people are faced with the question as to
whether certain entities “intentionally” arranged for the
disposal of hazardous substances, they will not simply pick out
some single type of state and decide all cases by checking to see
whether the entity has that state. It is not as though they will
always require that the agent act for the purpose of disposing,
nor will they always regard mere knowledge as sufficient, nor
will they take any other state of the agent to always be
necessary and sufficient in every case. Instead, people’s
intuitions will vary depending on the moral judgment they
make about the case at hand. They will take purpose to be
necessary in cases where they judge that disposing of
hazardous substances is morally good, whereas they will take
knowledge to be sufficient in cases where they judge that
disposing of hazardous substances is morally bad.90 Morally
neutral cases will lead to a judgment that lies somewhere in
between.91
Suppose we now apply this approach to the decision the
Court faced in Shell. We would no longer regard it as adequate
to look only at the degree to which Shell showed knowledge or
purpose; we would also be concerned with questions about the
moral status of the spills and leaks brought about by Shell’s
actions. Here, however, one finds a moral consensus in
contemporary American society. Congress originally passed
CERCLA amid a public outcry over the moral blameworthiness
of the corporations that failed to clean up hazardous waste
sites,92 and empirical studies indicate that people continue to
attach strong moral blame to the actors who created hazardous
waste dumps.93 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has permitted courts
to consider the “moral contribution” of owners of a hazardous
waste disposal site in determining contribution amounts under
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CERCLA.94 Applying people’s ordinary criteria for intentional
action, we would therefore arrive at the conclusion that Shell
intentionally arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances
and could be held liable for the morally bad environmental
damage that resulted.95
Turning to the decision in Babbitt, we can apply the
same basic logic. In that case, the majority determined that
knowledge alone would be sufficient to trigger liability, while
Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that intentional action was
necessary and that the logging companies could not be held
liable for any environmental damage brought about as a mere
side effect. We can now see that the ordinary understanding of
intentional action would regard this debate as resting on a
false dichotomy. As long as the outcome itself was widely
94

United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1991); see
also David August Konuch, Note, United States v. R.W. Meyer: The Sixth Circuit
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States
(Shell Oil Co.), 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (No. 07-1607). In essence, Justice Alito precisely
described the aforementioned scenarios about the Chairman in the experimental
hypotheticals. That is, he was imagining a situation where Shell chose a course that
maximized profits (here, saved money), and did so with the foresight or knowledge that
its choice would result in harm to the environment.
Strikingly, the linkage between knowledge and intentional action in such
cases is so intuitively powerful that Shell’s counsel, inconsistent with her own theory,
answered that Shell “might well be” liable under Justice Alito’s scenario. Id. Yet under
Shell’s theory of arranger liability, Shell should not be liable regardless of whether it
chose a cheaper carrier that happened to spill, because it would not have been Shell’s
specific intent to dispose of the hazardous material. The spillage would have merely
been a morally bad foreseeable side effect of Shell’s specific purpose to save money. In
answering that Shell might well be liable if it did choose a cheaper carrier but
contemplated disposal as a part of the transaction, however, Shell's counsel effectively
endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s “broader” arranger liability theory and the intuitive
judgment about Shell’s intentionality predicted by the aforementioned research. Over
the remainder of oral argument, Shell's counsel seemingly recognized the inconsistency
of her response and did backtrack, but later conceded that “there might be some case in
which you might attribute knowledge, infer intent from knowledge.” Id. at 17.
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judged a morally bad one, people’s ordinary understanding
might say both that knowledge alone was sufficient and that
intentional action was necessary. After all, people’s ordinary
understanding would say that knowledge was sufficient for
intentional action in cases in which the outcome was
sufficiently bad. In fact, the evidence does suggest that people
regard the killing of endangered species as morally bad,96 and
people’s ordinary understanding of the morality of harming
endangered and threatened species seems therefore to leave us
with the conclusion that the logging companies would be
intentionally harming the wildlife if they did so as a
foreseeable side effect of attaining some other goal.
Overall, then, people’s ordinary understanding seems to
differ on a truly fundamental level from the criteria invoked in
the Court’s recent decisions. People do not appear to regard
purpose as a necessary condition for intentional action.
Instead, their judgments are affected by their beliefs about the
moral status of the action itself, and in cases where the
consequence of the action appears to be morally bad, they are
willing to take knowledge alone as sufficient for inferring
intentionality.
In making this argument, we do not mean to suggest
that the Court should take facts about people’s ordinary
understanding of intentionality to be decisive in cases like the
ones we have been discussing here. The Court often
appropriately finds that various other considerations, such as
Chevron deference, stare decisis, or policy arguments, provide
strong reasons to depart from people’s ordinary understanding
of particular words or concepts. However, if such a situation
does arise, it would be best to explicitly acknowledge the need
to shift away from the practice of using words as they are
ordinarily understood and to explain why such a shift would be
justified. Absent some special reason, it seems that words like
“intentionally” should be understood to have just the same
96
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meanings they do in ordinary English, and the best way to
uncover these meanings is through systematic empirical
research.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have examined the implications of
research in experimental philosophy for two case studies in
environmental law. We found that the Court appeared to be
applying the concept of intentional action in different ways in
the different cases but that ordinary people show a surprisingly
consistent, complex and perhaps universal system of criteria.
These criteria involve a more holistic approach to the
understanding of human action. People’s intuitions about what
an agent did “intentionally” do not merely take into account
that agent’s principal purpose. Instead, people look at the
agent’s purpose, at the side effects that came along with an
attempt to bring about that purpose, and at the moral status of
the outcomes that actually resulted. To the extent that the
Court takes into account the concept of intentional action in a
way that accords more with people’s ordinary folk
understanding, it will adopt a broader notion of what it means
for an agent to intentionally bring about environmental harm.
But the point does not stop there. These questions in
environmental law can be seen as just one case study of a far
more general phenomenon. The concept of intentional action
plays a central role in numerous areas of the law, and in each
of these areas, courts are faced with difficult decisions about
the precise criteria under which an agent should be said to
have acted “intentionally” or “unintentionally.” Future
research can draw on empirical data to shed light on the ways
in which people ordinarily make sense of this whole range of
different cases. Though such empirical research would of
course not become decisive in legal determinations, it would
add an important and frequently overlooked consideration to
the existing debate on these complex legal issues.

